If we read what Premoli's Nomenclature Dictionary (1913) says about the term 'authenticity', we see it is defined as 'giving authenticity' or 'rendering authentic' an 'act' or 'document' so as to make it legally valid. The etymology of the word emphasizes the concept of authority as belonging to the person who acts as himself. Two essential elements are therefore the notion of agency and respect for the law. The two things are in a relationship of co-implication: authority -which we could translate: the subject as the outcome of a process of individuation or personalization -emanates from respect for the law, from common sense. Close relatives of authenticity are 'truth' and 'vitality'. We all use these terms in psychoanalysis and give them significant importance. All models of psychoanalysis put the concept of truth at the centre (Civitarese, 2014 (Civitarese, , 2018 . However, these terms suffer from a singular lack of precision. The reason is soon exposed: it is because they have to do with the sphere of affection and sentiment, and therefore cannot be thematised. How one feels, whether vital or not, authentic (true) or not, cannot be reduced to a conceptual formula.
A few years ago I described in a vignette an episode in which a visual image had shaken me out of a situation of mortiferous repetition with a patient with severe autistic traits and had, perhaps for the first time, made me feel a sense of vitality -an emotion that inevitably and usefully revitalized the relationship itself and the other, if only for what rational and emotional understanding was brought and especially because it renewed interest in a situation otherwise experienced as desperate. It so happened that, at the end of the session, my young patient had let her long scarf slip a couple of times while wrapping it around her neck, and I had "seen" the snake that held her in an implacable grip, an image of the sternly obsessive thought that constricted her creativity. Then the image was immediately transformed by association into that of Ka, the snake from the Jungle Book, thus opening up scenarios that were both Oedipal (the snake of Eden) and playful.
So why is image so important in psychoanalysis? For one thing, because thought is eminently visual (as we know, theoréin means 'to see'), but also because it is more ambiguous, more unstable, closer to the body and its emotional experiences than linguistic meanings. Even if still within
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the basic framework of humanity -that is of language as the only factor that allows to access, as we say, the register of the symboli, in other words, to gain self-awarness, to be able to say 'I' or to think thoughts -, images convey the knowledge of the body that is organized by rhythms and spacings that cannot be translated into words but which are no less important than words. The way to articulate these two dimensions of subjectivity is to think of chiasmus, the rhetorical figure used by Merleau-Ponty an essential interweaving, a system of cross-references (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) .
It goes without saying that images constitute the dream text, which we see more and more, to use a metaphor of Freud, as a poem of the mind; the poem of the mind that, when we are not too cluttered with violent emotions, helps us give a personal meaning (but one which is also impersonal or shared, consensual) to experience. Following some ideas I find are suggested by speculative thinking, I see the faculty of imagination as a kind of elf that revolves around the object to be known, no matter what it is, and that looks at it from many different perspectives; as it were, it takes many photographs. We feel true and real (authentic) not when we only have one picture of an object, as science seeks to provide us with, but when multiple images simultaneously give us back -as is the way of art -the truth of experience.
A second example I can give is from another essay published some years ago in which I described a very problematic situation -a patient who was not obsessive, like the one I mentioned, and whom I saw face-to-face weekly. She remained silent all the time. I drew on some images on the bags she carried with her and placed at her feet, which had made an impression on me: two small pumas, as in the logo of a well-known brand of shoes (were these scraps of aggression? I had asked myself, but they were also finally something alive), then two cartoon-style kittens (cuddles, tenderness). This is where my mental 'photographs' followed: an empty pool, which one did not dare enter, sharks, coral reefs ... and so on. We had managed to get characters into a play that at first seemed written by Beckett: this was a thought I had at the time and whose positive value I immediately felt, because I love Beckett's theatre. Then there were other characters with whom to construct, little by little, a story of the conscious and unconscious emotions that we experienced at every session.
Oftentimes that which makes us experience a sense of authenticity and vitality is something that imposes itself because of its particular sensory impact. Suddenly I notice, when I am already immersed in a whole series of stories of a patient and his analyst, that, having reformatted the text of the protocol of a session described during a supervision, two lines of text have been lost at the foot of each page and that three or four times the computer used line spacing not of one or two but of 12! Of course, even though the computer belongs to an analyst and has 'written' many texts on psychoanalysis, it cannot be said to have engaged in unconscious thinking, but posterioriour unconscious cannot but re-signify any event from its own point of view. In short, the empty space immediately suggests to me that, despite a whole number of positive things, a void, an unbridgeable distance, seems to have been created between analyst and patient, that too many pieces of 'text' are lost, and so on. Every time something like this happens, I feel gratitude for the analytic method and its intrinsic beauty. One of the recurrent thoughts I have at times is a sense of pity that everything we have said will be lost. Certain wonderful dreamlike constructions or puns: we talk about places in Sardinia and in a completely unexpected way Orosei is recast by a patient of mine as 'you are gold') ('sei oro'); or, on another occasion 'standby' becomes 'stand by me' etc. Other times it can be a certain use of punctuation, or the hallucinosis of attributing a remark to the wrong character, and so on.
In contemporary psychoanalysis, this ability to give form to emotions has become the heart of treatment. It is even said that the mother loves the child through her capacity for reverie. If there is a bond of love, she is able to dream, that is to say, to intuit, his deep needs and anxieties and to contain them. In this way, by absorbing this transformational function, the mind settles in the body for the first time. As we can see, this is not a purely rational, but rather a rational, imaginative and affective process. Not only does that which philosophers call intentionality of act intervene, but also body intentionality. We could define it as pre-reflexive, even if, as already stated, it was already rooted in the symbolic. According to Bion, it is essential that analysts are able to be painters or photographers of emotions, which light up in the relationship or in the analytic field. Of course, this should not remain
a vague and imprecise reference. If it did, it would not have much value. For an analyst, being an artist means having a rigorous theoretical framework and a coherent technique that allows him to make disciplined use of intuitive moments. The analyst's tool becomes the faculty of imagination, and since it is assumed that unconscious communication between minds is always taking place, the photographs that each person takes in their mind are seen as a joint creation. It is as if the couple was engaged at all times in a dance in which mutual recognition and the digestion/ representation of the ongoing emotional experience are at stake.
As in the case of photography, sophisticated equipment makes possible new and refined forms of expression, but ultimately the key element is the photographer's eye, his sensitivity, his person, his history. You can take brilliant shots with ordinary cameras. In analysis, the moment of the shot, at least with the most felicitous ones, or of the choice (not for nothing do we say 'chosen fact' or 'selected fact') happens in the same way for an impulse that is felt as such and which is not the result of a rational decision. It is not 'spontaneity' if I have a theory or model with which I can clearly and consistently justify this conduct and explain what its meaning is for the purposes of treatment.
Of course, as with a musician, talent can express itself at its best not when one knows nothing about musical theory and performance technique, but when these have been internalized to the point of becoming one with the person. Conscious and unconscious factors contribute; they cannot be separated. The quiddity that makes the difference remains an enigma; basically, it is about talent. And yet, for an artist, talent accounts only for a small percentage of skill. Everything else is work, study, experience. At least that is my experience. The vision that some have of the inspired artist or of the analyst-magician who disregards theories and models is a false vision -and I would go so far as to say unethical because it evades responsibility.
It is true, however, that there are also those who fetishize theory or technique and prove unable to exercise the 'negative capability' that Keats saw as being at the origin of true artistic creationand that Bion borrowed in his theoretical discourse. In analysis, negative capability is the ability to carry out a kind of phenomenological reduction, to suspend everything that is already known. You put everything you know in the background and you feel as if you were watching an object, a scene you had never seen before. It is a simple but effective recommendation and, paradoxically, "impossible" to follow. When you cannot set it aside, as Freud urged analysts to do by using free association and fluctuating attention -a way of forgetting the logical meaning of speech in order to enhance the play of the body of words -then everything becomes flat and sterile.
If I had to pick an analogy with art, I would turn to a musical comparison. Exactly the same tune can be pure poetry if played by Coltrane, but most of the time, if performed by another musician, it is just technique. We could take other examples, Turner's marine landscapes or Bacon's disfigured portraits, and so on. So, what distinguishes ordinary photography from that which we consider beautiful enough to be worthy of being exhibited in a museum? Can we say that artistic photography manages to transcend the alienation of nonartistic photography? Does the special relationship that photography has with presence and reality make it an art form distinct from all others? Thinking of the metaphor of photography as an art that, like analysis, has a special relationship with the aura of the present, I recalled some books I had read in the past, notably Walter Benjamin (1935) and Susan Sontag (1977) and I think these could provide us with some further ideas on our topic.
For instance, Sontag criticizes photography when it is used as a means of not seeing but rather of taking possession of the thing -a criticism that could be applied to the style of certain cold, intellectual and mechanical analysts. Photographs or/interpretations then become an act of violence, of symbolic seizing of the other, of capture of the object. In so far as it replaces the experience of reality, it becomes an alienating or anesthetizing filter with respect to what is seen and that often has to do with horror. At the Uffizi no one looks at the wonderful Adoration of the Magi by Leonardo, which has recently been restored. All are too busy documenting "I exist", "I was there". Painting, Sontag writes, has never had such imperial ambitions. On the contrary, what seems important with photos is hoarding them, even though later one no longer looks at them. It is simply a matter of storage and accumulation.
This is an important aspect that unites analysis and photography, a certain relationship with the immediacy of experience, with the here and now, and which distinguishes it from other forms of art, for example from painting. Photography seems to guarantee immediate access to reality. Barthes is perhaps the writer who has had the most interesting things to say about this point. The essential aspect, as he emphasizes, is the presence of the photographer in the scene photographed. Analysis and photography have a similar relationship with immediacy, one might say with the Referent. By their very nature they have to deal with things that are present in the flesh. For photography, this means a special relationship with Time and Death. Since the person taking the picture cannot be absent from the scene, what photography always says is: "This was and I was there and I saw it with my own eyes". All art has to do with transience. Like analysis, it is a work of mourning, a way of letting things passes by giving them meaning, but for photography this relationship becomes special. The person photographed becomes a spectre.
But even in analysis, if its essence is the work of symbolization, it is always a matter of dealing, so to speak, with the spectrality of the object (the no-breast or the no-thing) or rather with the concrete absence held as a virtual presence in the name, and with the concrete presence lost as an absence in the name. As Barthers writes: "[…] as soon as the reality is symbolized, caught in a symbolic network, the thing itself is more present in a word, in its concept, than its immediate physical reality. More precisely, we cannot return to the immediate reality: even if we turn from the word to the thing-from the word ' That beauty stands in a certain relationship with the ephemeral nature of all things? But, if so, then art has much to teach psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis also has much to say about art, as both set aesthetic experience as their ideal goal: that's where we restore body to the mind or mind to the body and we feel alive. For psychoanalysis, the aesthetic experience does not refer primarily to anything aestheticizing, but only to the dimension of meaning that we perceive as emotions. It is therefore clear that we can raedthe best definition of what an analyst does nowadays in the words of Cartier-Bresson and the idea he has of photography:
Wht is important for a photographer is involvement. It's not a propaganda means, photography, but it's a way of shouting what you feel. It's like the difference between a tract for propaganda and a novel. Well, the novel has to go through all the channel of the nerves, the imagination, and it's much more powerful than something you look at and throw away. If a theme is developed and goes into a novel, there is much more subtlety; it goes much deeper.
Poetry is the essence of everything, and it's through deep contact with reality and living fully that you reach poetry. Very often I see photographers cultivating the strangeness or awkwardness of a scene, thinking it is poetry. No. Poetry is two elements which are suddenly conflict -a spark between two elements. But it's given very seldom, and you can't look for it. It's like if you look for inspiration. No, it just comes by enriching yourself and living. If I go to a place, it's not to record what is going on only. It's to try and have a picture which concretizes a situation in one glance and which has the strong relations of shapes. And when I go to a country, well, I'm hoping always to get that one picture about which people will say, "Ah, this is true. You felt it right" (Cartier-Bresson, 1971, my underlining) .
Bion writes that even a psychoanalytic article must arouse emotions. And he wonders: "How many articles in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis have you read that were already dead?" And Winnicott: "Oh, God, may I be alive when I die" (C. Winnicott, 1989, p. 4) . In an excellent essay from about twenty years ago, Ogden (1995) writes that any form of psychic suffering results from a limitation of the individual's ability to feel fully alive as a human being. What these immediate associations say is that the task of psychoanalysis is much broader than solving psychic conflict, eliminating symptoms, expanding the ability to reflect on oneself and take the initiative, but it has to do with promoting the experience of feeling vital and with the fact that the aspect of vitality should be considered an analysis "in its own terms" (Ogden, 1995, p. 19) , hence the modern emphasis on creativity and play. So what does it mean today when we talk of cure in psychoanalysis? If we think of the writings of the analysts we like best, we all find this characteristic of being vital. There are texts that breathe and texts that oppress. In the former, the language is everyday language; the analyst expresses a genuine interest in getting to know the patient, acknowledges his emotions and uses theory with delicacy. In the latter he usually puts up walls of theory and jargon often takes on a moralistic tone, like a talking cricket, and frequently appears cold and insensitive.
And yet, if I have chosen to approach our subject starting from the concept of vitality, it is because the main idea was given to me by an analysis session with one of my patients, whom I will call Anna. Anna tells me that one day she realized everything was always fine in her life, so good that nobody noticed her. Instead she often feels empty inside. She is brilliant at her studies, but her emotional bonds are poor, not long-lasting, scarcely nourishing, lived without great enthusiasm, rather dull.
At a certain point she also fails in the area where she has always been admired, and falls into depression. There is intense family pressure to get back on track as soon as possible. However, despite having recovered from slipping into depression, Anna feels that she must put on hold her usual life as a perfect girl, and she shifts her interests in a 'neutral' field. She is fully involved in a sporting activity. It is completely secondary with respect to her professional objectives and proves to be a decisive test for her attempt to restructure emotional ties within the family. This new life, removed from the practical and utilitarian purpose of study, work and success, becomes the gym where she tries to regain vitality in her main relationships. There Anna is worthy because she is herself and not because of the exams she passes with flying colours. Her parents' attention is not directed at practical purposes and she can really feel recognized and safe.
To illustrate this point, namely how important it is to feel that one is loved for oneself and not for what one can do; I would like to introduce a vignette from another patient, taken from a supervision session. I will return to the theme of vitality later on and to the question of how in analysis it should not be left to the humanity and spontaneity of the analyst alone, but ought to become a theoretical and technical parameter as well. If seen as a real transformation in hallucinosis -that is, as a fragment of a dream dreamed in the waking state that expresses the attempt to give shape to an unconscious emotional experience -the slip of the pen by the colleague who presents the case is a felicitous event in the process of building the sense and meaning of the session. We have a surprising reformulation of the aesthetic conflict according to Bion and Meltzer (1989) fixed in the classic image of the child who agonizingly questions the sincerity of the mother. "Check or cheek?" here the patient is asked -and asks the object. The consonance of the two words evokes in me associations with Halloween and with the fateful question that children ask when they knock on their neighbour's door: 'trick or treat?' J. suspects that he is dealing with a witch and not with a mother.
Halloween
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This transformation gives us the opportunity to understand the unconscious emotional atmosphere that pervades the relationship at any given moment, and whether it is vital or not, to try to re-establish harmony with the patient.
This vignette also helps us realize that the dream of the analytic session continues in the act of writing the account and then in the shared dream of the supervision session. The association with Halloween is mine, and moreover in this case I am not even the analyst, but from the point of view of the theory of the analytic field one can rightly say that the association does not come from me but from us. This theory postulates that there are always unconscious exchanges between minds that generate an emotional field and unconscious field fantasies, whose meaning is more than the sum of the elements that make it up if taken in isolation. On the other hand, in order to give oneself an 'I', a body must be animated by the presence of others. For psychoanalysis, the mind is the one among individuals. The I is us, its fabric is woven by the infinite threads that connect us to each other, in essence therefore the 'I' is a web of relationships. To expand the 'I', therefore, it is necessary to connect more 'threads'. The capacity that human beings have acquired through biological evolution is to know how to stretch these threads among themselves. To cure in analysis is to weave threads of humanity, to expand the psychic container. The threads are the phantasmatic projections of each one into the other and the emotions that accompany them. It is on these threads that the definition of authentication (authenticity) as "making legally valid" is based.
It is not true, as some say, that the container/contained dichotomy is a false problem, because between the two there is a very precise hierarchy. In today's psychoanalysis, the content of truth that nourishes the mind is such only if it respects the capacity of the psychic container to accept it. Bion uses a curious image to describe the relationship between container and contained. Imagine the container as if it were a sort of grid of fabric sleeves connected together, and the fabric made of many intertwined threads of emotions. There is more. As a three-dimensional medium in which content is suspended, it then indicates "tolerance of doubt" (Bion, 1962, p.94) . When the relationship between container and contained is "convivial" (in a more technical sense, between preconception and realization; for example, between the innate expectation of the breast and the experience of breastfeeding), both grow. Bion ends up even talking about "convivial abstraction" (commensal abstraction) to say how a proto-concept of body order is formed, a kind of habit or sensitive idea or procedural scheme: nothing more than a component of what philosopher Merleau-Ponty calls body-intentionality (Merleau-Ponty, 1945 ).
Let's go back to our two vignettes. If we read Anna's dilemma in light of the second clinical fragment, it's easier to guess what her problem is. She is facing not only an enigmatic object, which is the rule, but an object with respect to which mistrust prevails over trust. Anna expects the witch and the poisoned apple and this becomes the lens through which she looks at any bond. The question is: okay, it is already important that a person has the ability to get in touch with the feeling that he/she has of him/herself and to express this sense of emptiness, but what does it mean to feel vital, and especially how can one give vitality back to someone in the cure?
First of all, it must be said that this awareness is not always there. The person may feel absolutely vital while in fact he is lying to himself. And the meaning of vitality is elusive. The word is not found in Laplanche and Pontalis' The Language of Psychoanalysis (1988) . The Treccani Dictionary 2 of the Italian language tells us that it is the aptitude to live. We cannot identify it with a set of ideational contents, although they may be part of it. Nor is it just the tone of how it is assessed in psychiatry. It is more something of the order of feeling that one has of oneself at any given time. But can one give oneself a sense of vitality? I would say no. The most difficult thing to understand, or the least immediate, is that, apart from the components of temperament and the contingent aspects of life, the sense of vitality is a social fact. I can only feel vital in someone's eyes. In these eyes you must be able to reflect yourself in a way that makes you feel content, in essence loved. You become yourself through this mirroring. If you feel coldly reflected, something inside you remains silent, inert, sterile, and indefinite. Sometimes this happens. There are people who function in a de-personalized way in their life, that is, on the basis of a split between mind and body, because they have been recognized in 2 http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/vitalita
their intellectual talents but without real warmth and affection. That is why, when other solutions have not worked, the only way to be seen may, as in the case of Anna, be failure.
The elements most directly connected to the feeling of vitality are emotional; they are embodied memories, procedural schemes, fantasies in the body (Gaddini, 1982) and therefore cannot be expressed in words and concepts except indirectly. That is also why we nowadays put so much stress on the role of the analyst's person; certainly not to fall into a kind of uncritical sentimentalism in which each is a measure unto himself without any comparison with the others. This is something that is impossible, since one cannot remove oneself from the field of sociality expressed in language. One can lose oneself in non-consensuality, which is a very different thing. Let's do a simple experiment. Let's imagine having to refer a loved one to a therapist. Would we not send him or her to a person we know is expert and capable professionally but also empathic and vital? If it were a surgeon, it would not be the same. Why? Because for analysts these personal parameters also bear a theoretical and technical significance.
U-turn->you-turn->turn->turn-you-up
A. tells me a nightmare in which she leaves her house at night and every time sje wants to mak a U-turn but can't. At some point, she arrives at a military post where they tell her that, given her work, she could stop there because the next day they are expecting a delegation from the psychiatric hospital. The reason seems to be the climate of alarm (the 'militarization') that there is in the family because of the imminent loss of an elder member who is severely ill. They are all anxious about the situation. But this narrative, which is reflected in the dream, can also be understood as an allegory that speaks to the moments of separation of various kinds in the analysis instead.
With a pun, the point is that U-turn as withdrawal from relationship is heard and transformed first into your-turn or you-turn, or even turn-you-up. Who? An external and internal object, or the analyst, so that she can realize the situation, become receptive again and placate A.'s anguish. In this case it is the transformation from U-turn to you-turn that organizes a field of meaning, opens new perspectives and indeed becomes a function of containment.
The essential factor in this transformation is the surprise effect that accompanies the transition from confusion and anxiety to something that seems meaningful when viewed in the light of context. Without this emotional element it would be something purely conceptual, cold and mechanical. Narrative transformations in the analytic field are not merely narrative because the selected fact that on each occasion organizes them "is the name of an emotional experience, the emotional experience of a sense of discovery of coherence" (Bion, 1962, p. 73) . At the heart of this precious moment lies the possibility of accepting and understanding the other, of instilling vitality.
You see the meaning of working in the here and now. The analyst uses a phenomenological criterion: obviously he takes into account the past of the patient and always reacts with humanity to his pain and the history of the traumas he has suffered, but he also 'brackets them off' to focus on the level at which his intervention might be more useful to him. There is a kind of epoché. The analyst looks at things as if he had never seen them before: he de-realizes or de-concretizes them. The reality that he is concerned with is the one on which he can act most directly -the psychic reality. Actually, meaning is created through the construction of an intimate climate in the therapeutic relationship. It is as if every time the analyst had rediscovered that he is not a silent witness but a central character in the play that each time is staged in the theatre of analysis. If the unconscious does not lie behind or under, but within the conscious and vice versa, and therefore always speaks, and not only when it escapes the control of the double censorship hypothesized by Freud, even the stories of real traumas and concrete situations of the patient's life must necessarily always mean something else. Moreover, being attentive to the unconscious plane of communication does not in any way prevent us from acknowledging what the patient has suffered or is suffering, but adds another significant layer of meaning. On the other hand, apodictically sticking to the value of history as a sort of rocky layer of the psyche, removed from any possibility of unconscious signification, is both naive and in certain cases even irresponsible.
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Nowadays the analytic couple is seen as continually engaged in a process of mutual recognition or, in other words, of subjectivation; as in a process of constant negotiation of the reciprocal status as person. This is specific to the field of analysis. In short, the role of emotion is strongly asserted here as an (en)gram or pictogram with respect to essential facts such as the process of self-construction of the subject, and the feeling of vitality. This also reflects the clinical experience that tells us that what patients suffer from is that they cannot contain (transform) emotions that are too violent. The unknown of O (unconscious proto-emotional experience of the relationship) is then the emotional position occupied by the patient and the analyst on the map that charts the vicissitudes of the relationship. In analysis only this really deserves to be investigated and everything must be directed towards the goal of the emotional encounter. This is why for Bion only what is under the eyes of analyst and patient can be known: "In psycho-analysis any O not common to analyst and analysand alike, and not available therefore for transformation by both, may be ignored as irrelevant to psycho-analysis. Any O not common to both is incapable of psycho-analytic investigation; any appearance to the contrary depends on a failure to understand the nature of psycho-analytic interpretation" (Bion, 1965, pp. 48-49, my underlining) .
But this precept is the most widely disregarded in clinical practice, often also by analysts who base themselves on Bion's theories. The impulse to cling to the concreteness of reality, historical or present, is simply too strong. This is the kind of attitude that Ferro ironically styled 'Bion à la carte', because it avoids making the effort to confront his radical reformism, as expressed, for example, in the following paragraph (Ferro, 2017):
"Psychoanalytic "observation" is concerned neither with what has happened nor with what is going to happen, but with what is happening. Furthermore, it is not concerned with sense impressions or objects of sense … Every session attended by the psychoanalyst must have no history and no future … What is "known" about the patient is of no further consequence: it is either false or irrelevant … The only point of importance in any session is the unknown. Nothing must be allowed to distract from intuiting that … Obey the following rules … Do not remember past sessions … no crisis should be allowed to breach this rule … The psychoanalyst can start by avoiding any desires for the approaching end of the session (or week, or term). Desires for results, 'cure' or even understanding must not be allowed to proliferate … These rules must be obeyed all the time and not simply during the session … If this discipline is followed, there will be an increase of anxiety in the psychoanalyst at first, but it must not interfere with preservation of the rules. The procedure should be started at once and not be abandoned on any pretext whatever" (Bion, 1992, pp. 380-2, my underlining) .
Bion also explains why it is so difficult to adhere to these principles: 1. Increased anguish because there is no barrier against fear of recognized dangers.
2. No barrier to guilt because there is no known substitute for the recognised and conventional therapeutic purposes.
3. Isolation from group key assumptions (ibid., p. 296).
If the most effective way of helping patients acquire affective competence is through the filter of the current relationship with the analyst, then the truth of what happens cannot be solely cognitive. Nor is it enough to use any emotional reaction, for example as a counter-transferential response, if still read in a unidirectional sense. In addition, one must engage deeply in the relationship and therefore feel the burden of responsibility for what is happening in it. If it is not something that has already happened or that happens elsewhere, but that happens here and now, he can try immediately to improve the atmosphere of the encounter. Letting O 'evolve' or 'become' means not taking refuge in hasty and abstract interpretations of the facts of the analysis but encouraging the development of emotional-experiential knowledge. From this perspective, Bion's entire work can be seen as a radical attempt to reposition psychoanalysis (theory and practice) in the area of the unconscious, dream and body -not the anatomical body but the lived body.
Another obvious meaning of this theoretical and practical approach is that the direct and continuous emotional involvement of the analyst that takes place each time, moving along the lines of a centripetal strain, brings the discourse back to the dream of the session, and therefore to the therapeutic
relationship, and makes hyper-amplified signals available to him to map their respective positions in the analytic field. If, for example, a patient recounts a childhood memory or an event from his current life, the analyst can only have indirect knowledge of it and try to empathize with him perhaps by using a conscious identification. If instead he reads the same memory as an unconscious communication related to the living emotions of the present relationship, he will have some kind of direct cognition -a lived cognition, to be precise, one that is less inclined towards K and more towards O. And not only that: like any unconscious transformation, the perspective he takes from it will be richer and more 'real' than any other that is confined to conscious experience. It is not that the analyst cannot know anything about the patient if he values the historical or reality content of his speech; rather, for the purposes of the analysis, and on the basis of all the premises listed so far, the second way of knowing carried out through referring everything to the here and now is more relevant. In other words, just like the scalpel of the surgeon, the main instrument of the analyst is a radical notion of receptivity with respect to the unconscious functioning of the minds in the here and now of the session. Receptivity to the productions of the unconscious allows the analytic couple to generate meaning and thus to expand the space of the dream and of inner life.
